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I. INTRODUCTION
In employment law, not all workplace discrimination leads to employer
liability. The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is a 
crucial component in determining employer liability.1 For instance, courts
analyze coworker and customer harassment on a negligence standard.2 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 even expressly exempts particular 
employers.3  On the other hand, alter ego and supervisor harassment result 
in vicarious liability.4 
However, the use of labor contractors posits a different query: whether 
the use of a labor contractor renders third-party entities subject to Title 
VII liability.  The Ninth Circuit suggests: yes, under joint employer liability 
theory.5 
Courts have not uniformly applied a test to determine whether an entity
may be held liable under Title VII as a joint employer.6  Some courts have 
analyzed liability based on varying degrees of control.7  Other courts have 
applied elaborate multifactor tests to determine whether an employer
1. See, e.g., DeLia v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 656 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011)
(declaring lack of employment relationship “fatal” to plaintiff’s Title VII claim). 
2. See SUSAN GROVER, SANDRA F. SPERINO & JAROD S. GONZALEZ, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 242 (2d ed. 2014). 
3. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1)–(2)
(2012) (companies with less than twenty-five employees are exempt from Title VII coverage).  
Title VII protects against employment practices that “discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  Id. § 2000e–2(a)(1). 
4. “Under the [alter ego] theory, which has traditionally served as a way of justifying 
vicarious liability, the agent is the ‘alter ego.’”  Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors’ 
and Officers’ Liability for Supervision and Management: Exploring the Intersection of 
Corporate and Tort Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1661, 1694–95 (2010). See Jodi R. Mandell, 
Comment, Mack v. Otis Elevator: Creating More Supervisors and More Vicarious Liability for 
Workplace Harassment, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 521, 527, 541–50 (2005), for an examination of 
the “rationale behind the vicarious liability of employers for harassment by their supervisors.” 
5. See generally EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2019). 
6. See Towns v. Tenn. Dep’t of Agric., No. 17-cv-02603-SHM-tmp, 2019 WL 
2323636, at *3–5 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 21, 2019), for a brief summary of the circuit split
regarding the proper test for determining an employer under Title VII. 
 
7. See, e.g., Al-Saffy v. Vilsack, 827 F.3d 85, 96–97 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also
Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cty., 772 F.3d 802, 810 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n entity other than 
the actual employer may be considered a ‘joint employer’ ‘only if it exerted significant
control over’ the employee.” (emphasis added) (quoting Heileman Brewing Co. v. NLRB, 
879 F.2d 1526, 1530 (7th Cir. 1989))). 
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controlled an employee’s work and employment.8  Still others have examined
whether two separate entities “co-determine . . . essential terms and conditions 
of employment.”9  In particular, one of the most prevalent tests is the 
Darden test, under which the Supreme Court “adopt[ed] a common-law 
[agency] test for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’” when 
determining retirement benefits.10  After noting that its circuit had “not yet
adopted a test for determining when an entity may be held liable as a joint 
employer under Title VII,” the Ninth Circuit opted for a blended Darden 
test.11  In implementing this test, the court held that a third party was also 
considered an employer under Title VII and, therefore, could be held 
liable for Title VII violations.12 
Although the circuit split is not new, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling has much 
deeper ramifications than other circuit decisions.  The expansion of joint 
employer liability drastically undermines the ability to contract labor.13 
Additionally, although this case stemmed from a Washington state case,
this ruling threatens California’s economy—and it guts the United States’ 
agricultural system.14  Moreover, this may be just the beginning of the 
8. See, e.g., Casey v. HHS, 807 F.3d 395, 404–05 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying fifteen
factors); Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639–41 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying a multi-
factor economic reality test). 
9.  Bristol v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Clear Creek, 312 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 
2002) (quoting Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 1994)).
10. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). Although
Darden dealt with defining an employee under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act, a number of courts have applied tests resembling Darden. Id. at 323–24; see, e.g., 
Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2015); Sutherland v. Mich. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 612 (6th Cir. 2003). Note that this Casenote only 
examines tests under Title VII because courts apply different tests for each area of 
employment law.  See, e.g., Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 
5 (Cal. 2018).  “Here we must decide what standard applies . . . for purposes of California 
wage orders.”  Id. 
11.  EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 637–39 (9th Cir. 2019). 
12. Id. at 637. 
13. The agricultural industry has historically relied on various third-party contracting
“schemes” to reduce costs.  See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra Section IV.A.
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expansion,15 and joint employer liability theory may soon infiltrate other 
industries, such as the franchise industry.16 
Part II examines the H–2A guest worker visa program, the labor 
contractor role, and the title case, EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc.17  Part
III explores joint employer liability and the Ninth Circuit’s decision to 
adopt the blended Darden test.18  Finally, Part IV surveys the potential
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in California, as well as its 
effect on other industries.19  A limited exception for the agricultural industry
may best promote both Title VII protections and the agricultural industry.20 
Instead, advocates should focus on exploring nontraditional legal remedies 
for protecting this vulnerable portion of the American workforce.21 
II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR GLOBAL HORIZONS
Under the H–2A visa program, foreign workers enter the United States
to work in the agricultural industry.22  These “guest workers” are commonly 
recruited by labor contractors.23 In Washington state, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleged that a labor contractor and two 
farmers harassed a group of guest workers based on their Thai national 
origin, a violation of Title VII’s equal protection laws.24  The issue was whether 
the labor contractor was responsible as the sole employer or whether the 
two farmers could also be held liable, in addition to the labor contractor, 
as joint employers.25 
15. Labor law is witnessing a similar expansion. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Cal. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1199–200 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding a reserved right to 
control—not actual control—solidified a third party’s status as employer under Title VII).  
Labor law is a discrete area of law that is separate from employment law.  Compare 
KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE (2d
ed. 2014), with GROVER, SPERINO & GONZALEZ, supra note 2. 
16. See infra Section IV.B.
 17. See infra Part II. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Section IV.A.
 21. See infra Part V. 
22. See infra Section II.A.
 23. See infra Section II.B.
24. EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., No. CV-11-3045-EFS, 2012 WL 3095577, at *3 
(E.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), rev’d and remanded 915 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2019); see infra
Section II.C.1.  The EEOC “is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal 
to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person’s race, color, 
religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age 
(40 or older), disability[,] or genetic information.”  Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/2XVE-J5Q7]. 
25. See infra Section II.C.2. 
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A. H–2A Visas 
H–2A visas are nonimmigration visas that allow foreign workers to
come to the United States to engage in temporary or seasonal work.26 
Under the H–2A visa program, an employer must “[d]emonstrate that
there are not enough U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and
available to do the temporary work.”27  Additionally, the employer must 
establish that the influx of H–2A workers “will not adversely affect the 
wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.”28 
For decades, federal labor law has “recognized the reliance of certain
industries on low wage labor” from foreigners.29  Many foreign workers 
come to the United States to work and send money back to their countries 
of origin.30  The H–2A program thus balances the employer’s demand for 
“adequate labor supply” and the domestic employee’s ability to work.31 
In other words, farm owners maintain an adequate supply of labor without 
stripping any highly sought-after jobs from domestic workers. 
California, in particular, employs a hefty portion of H–2A visa holders.32 
Because the H–2A program is not an immigration program, there is “no 
visa cap.”33  The number of H–2A jobs available has continued to rise
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2018); H–2A Temporary Agricultural Workers, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/
temporary-workers/h-2a-temporary-agricultural-workers [https://perma.cc/9LG9-3K35].
27. H–2A Temporary Agricultural Workers, supra note 26. See generally 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1188(a)(1) (2018). 
28. H–2A Temporary Agricultural Workers, supra note 26. See generally 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1188(a)(1). 
29. Elizabeth M. Dunne, Comment, The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Policy: 
Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented 
Workers, 49 EMORY L.J. 623, 635 (2000). 
30. See Richard E. Blum, Note, Labor Standards Enforcement and the Realities of
Labor Migration: Protecting Undocumented Workers After Sure-Tan, the IRCA, and Patel, 63 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1342, 1372 (1988) (“[E]ven subminimum wages earned in the United 
States and sent home can substantially help household members left behind.”). 
31. United Farmworkers of Am. v. Chao, 227 F. Supp. 2d 102, 108 (D.D.C. 2002). 
32. See Philip Martin, The H–2A Farm Guestworker Program Is Expanding Rapidly, 
WORKING ECON. BLOG (Apr. 13, 2017, 5:54 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/h-2a-farm-
guestworker-program-expanding-rapidly/ [https://perma.cc/6VYH-LKMU] (“Approximately
half of H–2A jobs . . . were certified in [five] states: Florida, North Carolina, Georgia, 
Washington, and California.”). 
 33. Preston Huennekens, Unlimited Cheap Farm Labor: Evaluating H–2A Disclosure
Data, CTR. IMMIGR. STUD. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://cis.org/Report/Unlimited-Cheap-Farm-
Labor-Evaluating-H2A-Disclosure-Data [https://perma.cc/8EJF-RGA4].
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steadily,34 “growing [at] an average of [thirteen] percent a year.”35  Thus,
a court decision that alters the relationship between farmers and H–2A 
holders may have much further-reaching ramifications in California than 
in the rest of the United States.36 
B. Labor Contractors 
In the agricultural industry, growers commonly work with farm labor
contractors.37  The agricultural industry has maintained a long history of
“schemes involving intermediaries,”38 such as farm labor contractors, who 
recruit and supervise agricultural workers.39  Studies show that some of 
the key reasons that growers use farm labor contractors are to reduce legal 
liability40 and expenses.41  In other words, labor contractors generally shift
legal obligations away from farmers,42 which can leave agricultural workers 
with “judgment-proof” employers—that is, labor contractors.43 
34. See Martin, supra note 32. 
 35. Huennekens, supra note 33 (citing U.S. STATE DEP’T, TABLE XVI(B):
NONIMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED BY CLASSIFICATION (INCLUDING BORDER CROSSING CARDS), 
FISCAL YEARS 2013–2017, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Statistics/Annual
Reports/FY2017AnnualReport/FY17AnnualReport-TableXVIB.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8GW6-2H4W]).
36. See infra Section IV.A.
 37. See, e.g., Occupational Employment Statistics: Occupational Employment and 
Wages: 13–1074 Farm Labor Contractors, BUREAU LAB. STATS. (May 2018) [hereinafter 
Occupational Employment Statistics], https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes131074.htm 
[https://perma.cc/546Z-8P4Z]; What Does a Farm Labor Contractor Do?, YOUR FREE 
CAREER TEST, https://www.yourfreecareertest.com/farm-labor-contractor [https://perma.cc/
U8XV-W2HD].
38. Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 
988 (1999).
 39. Allison Ryan, Comment, You Are the Employer Even If You’re Not: Joint 
Employment Under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 25 SAN 
JOANQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 91, 94 (2015). 
40. See, e.g., Dawn Thilmany & Philip L. Martin, Farm Labor Contractors Play 
New Roles in Agriculture, CAL. AGRIC., Sept.–Oct. 1995, at 37, 38–39. 
41. “Once an employer decides to enter the H–2A program, the law creates incentives
to prefer guest workers over U.S. workers.  For example, the employer must pay Social 
Security and unemployment taxes on U.S. workers’ wages but is exempt from paying these 
taxes on guest workers’ wages.”  FARMWORKER JUSTICE, NO WAY TO TREAT A GUEST: 
WHY THE H–2A AGRICULTURAL VISA PROGRAM FAILS U.S. AND FOREIGN WORKERS 7, 
https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/documents/7.2.a.6%20fwj.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R42A-G7ZD].
42. Sean A. Andrade, Comment, Biting the Hand that Feeds You: How Federal Law 
Has Permitted Employers To Violate the Basic Rights of Farmworkers and How This Has 
Begun to Impact Other Industries, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 601, 617 n.74 (2002). 
43.  Goldstein et al., supra note 38, at 988. 
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C. Title VII Discrimination Claim 
In Global Horizons, the Thai guest workers suffered repugnant working
conditions while employed in Washington state under the H–2A program.44 
However, the real issue was which business entity—or entities—could be 
held liable: the labor contractor, or the farmers and the labor contractor.45 
1. The Allegations
Two farmers, Green Acres and Valley Fruits, contracted with labor
contractor Global Horizons.46  Global Horizons hired “impoverished Thai
nationals,” promising they would “make much money” and “work steady 
hours.”47  Despite the “huge fees” Global Horizons charges its workers to
be a part of its H–2A guest worker program, hundreds of workers joined 
the program.48 
The EEOC alleged that both the farmers and the labor contractor engaged 
in a pattern or practice of discriminatory treatment and created a hostile 
work environment because of the workers’ Thai race and national origin.49 
The EEOC alleged that all three entities—Green Acres, Valley Fruits, and 
Global Horizons—participated in this discrimination.50  Workers stated 
that the three employers “yelled” at them, assigned “more difficult” tasks 
to them compared to non-Thai workers, and provided “transportation, 
housing, and subsistence . . . [that] were unsafe and insufficient.”51 
Although Global Horizons oversaw the workers’ transportation, housing,
and boarding, according to the agreements with the farmers, the Thai
workers complained to Green Acres about the inadequate transportation and
living conditions.52  As a result, the labor contractors gave the Thai workers
fewer work hours, and the Thai workers “continued to suffer” from 
harassment.53 At Valley Fruits, the Thai workers expressed their concern 
44. EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., No. CV-11-3045-EFS, 2012 WL 3095577, at *1 
(E.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), rev’d and remanded 915 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2019). 
45. Id. at *3.
















     
 
   


















that their pay was too low “to pay off their substantial debt.”54  As a result, 
Valley Fruits reduced their work hours as well, and Global Horizons
“threatened to deport them or transfer them to a different farm.”55  Global 
Horizons also held the Thai workers’ passports and “limited the [workers’] 
ability to leave the orchards and residences.”56  Some of the workers were 
so fraught that they “were compelled to escape.”57 
2. The Issue: Determining Who Is an Employer Under Title VII
Global Horizons turned on whether or not the two farmers could be held 
jointly liable, alongside the labor contractor, as employers under Title VII.58 
An employer held liable under Title VII is subject to both legal and equitable 
remedies.59  Under Title VII, a court may award injunctions, back pay,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages,60 which means that holding a
second employer responsible for a Title VII violation doubles the resources 
for these remedies. 
Although it is not uncommon to hold farmers and labor contractors 
equally responsible for violations, Global Horizons had entered into contracts
with Green Acres and Valley Fruits that granted significant “control [to
the farmers] over the work to be performed.”61  Additionally, although the
farmers set work product expectations, such as “advis[ing] . . . what work 
needed to be done and how to do it,” supplying the “necessary equipment, 
set[ting] the work hours, and inspect[ing] the work done,” Global Horizons 
physically supervised the workers and supplied the housing, transportation, 
and subsistence.62 
Green Acres, Valley Fruits, and Global Horizons all agreed that they 
“were joint employers of the Thai workers as to orchard-related matters.”63 
Thus, the farmers would be held jointly liable alongside the labor contractor 
for any alleged harassment that occurred while working on the orchard; 
however, under this holding the farmers would not be responsible for any 
alleged harassment that occurred while the Thai workers were not working at
the orchard—such as the poor living conditions.  Therefore, the pivotal
question in this case was whether the three parties “were also joint employers
54. Id.
 55. Id.
 56. Id. at *2. 
57. Id.
58.  EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 2019). 
59.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g) (2012). 
60. Id.
 61. Glob. Horizons, 2012 WL 3095577, at *1. 
62. Id.
 63.  Glob. Horizons, 915 F.3d at 633. 
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with respect to the non-orchard-related matters.”64  Under the labor contracts, 
the labor contractor Global Horizons was solely responsible for non-
orchard-related matters.65 
III. THE RULING: THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS A TEST FOR JOINT 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII 
The Ninth Circuit applied joint employer liability theory to find that the
EEOC had correctly alleged that the farmers were joint employers, and
therefore proper defendants alongside the labor contractor.66  This Part
briefly summarizes the joint employer theory,67 examines a prevalent common 
law test for establishing joint employer status,68 reviews the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis,69 and questions whether joint employer status should apply to
the agricultural industry.70 
A. The Joint Employer Liability Theory 
Under joint employer liability theory, two separate entities may be held 
legally liable as employers for workplace misconduct.71 A variety of 
scenarios may give rise to joint employer liability; however, the Supreme 
Court has primarily entertained joint employer liability theory in the labor 
law context.72  The Court first broached the subject of joint employer
64. Id. at 634. 
65. Id. at 640; Glob. Horizons, 2012 WL 3095577, at *1; see also supra note 62 and 
accompanying text. 
66. See infra Section III.C.
 67. See infra Section III.A. 
68. See infra Section III.B.
 69. See infra Section III.C.
 70. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
 71. See, e.g., EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 2019). 
72. See, e.g., Local 24, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 292 (1959); 
see also Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 475 (1964); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 
U.S. 335, 336–37 (1964); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 
U.S. 10, 14 (1963). 
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liability under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)73 sixty years 
ago.74 
More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that joint employer liability 
exists in some—but not all—contexts.75 Circuit courts have followed suit;
the District of Columbia Circuit, for example, has reaffirmed that joint
employer liability existed under the NLRA.76  The Fifth,77 Sixth,78 and 
Seventh79 Circuits have applied joint employer liability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. Additionally, several circuits have leveraged joint
employer theory for the purposes of Title VII liability.80  One issue, however,
is which test should determine joint employer status.81 
B. The Agency Test Under Darden
Under Supreme Court precedent, the agency test is a “well established” 
common law test for establishing employer status.82  To determine agency, a
court should consider the entity’s “right to control the manner and means 
by which the product is accomplished.”83  A court should consider “all of
the incidents of the relationship . . . with no one factor being decisive.”84 
73. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69  (2012).  The NLRA governs certain
relations and activities regarding employees’ rights to unionize.  See National Labor Relations 
Act, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/how-we-work/national-labor-
relations-act [https://perma.cc/W33X-KTUP] (“Congress enacted the National Labor 
Relations Act . . . in 1935 to protect the rights of employees and employers, to encourage 
collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector labor and management practices, 
which can harm the general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”). 
74. See Local 24, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 358 U.S. at 292; see also Boire, 376 U.S. 
at 475; Humphrey, 375 U.S. at 336–37; McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 14. 
75. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 n.20 (2014) (“More important[ly], the
joint-employer standard was developed for use in other contexts.”). 
76. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1199–200 (D.C. Cir. 
2018).
77. Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 228–29 (5th Cir. 2015). 
78. Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, Inc., 128 F.3d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 
1997).
79.  Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cty., 772 F.3d 802, 810 (7th Cir. 2014). 
80. See, e.g., Frey v. Hotel Coleman, 903 F.3d 671, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2018); Al-
Saffy v. Vilsack, 827 F.3d 85, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 
F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015); Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 
408–10 (4th Cir. 2015). 
81. See infra Section III.B.
82. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992) (first citing
Kelley v. S. Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1974); then citing Baker v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. 
Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959) (per curiam); and then citing Robinson v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. 
Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915)). 
83. Id. at 323 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751
(1989)).
84. Id. at 324 (citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)). 
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For example, in Darden, the Court elaborated that common factors used
to determine employer status included the following considerations: 
[T]he hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product 
is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill 
required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work;
the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has 
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired
party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the 
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the 
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.85 
By contrast, the economic reality test “focus[es] on the economic reality 
of the particular relationship between [the parties].”86  However, this test is
generally applied under legislation encompassing “broad statutory definitions.”87 
Occasionally, courts even apply a “hybrid” of the two tests for purposes 
of Title VII.88 
Although Darden89 is a prevalent common law test to determine 
employer status,90 the issue is whether this approach supports a finding of
joint employer status in the agricultural industry.  In Darden, the Supreme 
Court only questioned the approach to determining one entity’s status— 
not joint employer status.91 By finding two employers liable, a court does
not hold the right employer liable; instead, a court applies an overly broad 
reading of employer status. By applying Darden to determine joint
employer liability, a court merely expands the defendant list in search of 
deeper pockets and strikes a vital blow to the agricultural community.92 
85. Id. at 323–24 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751–52). 
86. Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Antenor v. D
& S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 932 (11th Cir. 1996)).  Thus, under this test, the farmers would 
not be “employers” of the Thai workers because the labor contractor recruited the workers 
and promised them “much money.”  See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
87. EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 639 (9th Cir. 2019) (first citing
Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 641; and then citing Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 
704 F.2d 1465, 1469–70 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
88. See, e.g., Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945–46 (9th Cir.
2010); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1983). 
89. See generally Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–23. 
90. See, e.g., Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2015);
Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 612 (6th Cir. 2003); Loomis Cabinet 
Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 20 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1994). 
91. Darden, 503 U.S. at 320–21. 
92. See infra Section IV.A.
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Instead, legal advocates should focus on other methods to protect agricultural 
workers that do not undermine the agricultural system.93 
C. The Ninth Circuit Adopts a Blended Darden Test
The court conceded that the issue of joint employer liability under Title 
VII was an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit.94  The court 
expressly rejected other tests in favor of the common law agency test to 
find Green Acres and Valley Fruits were joint employers, along with 
Global Horizons, for the purposes of Title VII.95  This meant that the farmers 
could be held responsible for harassment for both orchard and non-
orchard-related matters.96 Additionally, the court reiterated that entities
could not contract around H–2A requirements.97  However, because this 
precedent will have detrimental repercussions for California’s agricultural 
industry,98 the issue is whether, from a policy standpoint, a proper
interpretation of the H–2A program requirements allows for a finding of 
joint employer liability. 
1. The Court’s Reasoning
The Ninth Circuit correctly applied Supreme Court precedent to determine
what kind of test to apply to determine joint employer status.99  The Ninth
Circuit concluded that when statutory definitions are circular,100 courts
traditionally apply common law.101  The application of common law “reflects
an expectation that courts will look to the common law to fill gaps in 
statutory text, particularly when an undefined term has a settled meaning 
93. See infra Section IV.A.
94.  EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 637–38 (9th Cir. 2019). 
95. See infra Section III.C.1. 
96.  Glob. Horizons, 915 F.3d at 637–38. 
97. See infra Section III.C.2. 
98. See infra Section IV.A.
 99. Glob. Horizons, 915 F.3d at 638 (first citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992); and then citing Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. 
v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–45, 447 (2003)). 
100. As the Supreme Court has noted, defining an “employer” or an “employee” is 
often circular; for instance, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s definition of 
“employee” is “any individual employed by an employer,” and thus lends little clarification 
when defining the employer-employee relationship.  Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (quoting 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2012)). 
101. Glob. Horizons, 915 F.3d at 638 (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 323). 
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at common law.”102  In employment law, the expectation is often to fill
that gap with agency law.103 
By applying the agency test, the Ninth Circuit adopted a blended 
Darden test.104 To begin its analysis, the Ninth Circuit looked to Clackamas 
Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells’s common law test, under which 
“‘the principal guidepost’ is the element of control—that is, ‘the extent of 
105 control that one may exercise over the details of the work of the other.’”
Then, to determine the “extent of control,” the Ninth Circuit looked to
Darden’s “non-exhaustive list of factors.”106  The Ninth Circuit further
acknowledged that the Supreme Court cautioned that this is a factually 
intensive inquiry: “[T]here is ‘no shorthand formula’ for determining whether 
an employment relationship exists.”107 
In embracing the agency test, the Ninth Circuit firmly rejected the 
alternative economic reality test.108  The court opined that the economic
reality test, which focuses on “whether workers are economically dependent 
on the alleged joint employer,”109 had been developed in contexts that differed
from Title VII in “material aspects.”110 However, the court did acknowledge 
that adopting such a test can “produce the same outcome in a joint 
employment analysis.”111 
Under the agency test, the court concluded that the EEOC had correctly
alleged that Green Acres and Valley Fruits were joint employers of both 
102. Id. (citing Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 538 U.S. at 447). 
103. Id.  However, nontraditional methods of gap filling may be a better option in 
the agricultural industry.  See infra notes 139–49 and accompanying text. 
104. See Glob. Horizons, 915 F.3d at 637–39. 
105. Id. at 638 (citing Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., 538 U.S. at 448). 
106. Id. (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24).  Factors included required skills, whether 
the entity furnished “instrumentalities and tools,” work location, length of working 
relationship, the “right to assign additional projects,” “discretion over when and how long 
to work,” payment terms, hiring process, “whether the work is part of the regular business 
of the hiring party,” employee benefits, and “tax treatment of the hired party.”  Id. 
 107. Id. (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 324). 
108. Id.
 109. Id. (citing Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
110. The Ninth Circuit suggested that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the 
Migrant Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) were too different from 
Title VII. Id. at 639.  “Unlike Title VII, both the FLSA and the AWPA provide broad 
definitions of ‘employ’ that expand the scope of employment relationships beyond the 
common-law understanding.”  Id. (first citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(g), 1802(5) (2012); and 
then citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 326). 
111. Id.  Although, this interpretation is doubtful in this case. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text. 
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orchard-related and non-orchard-related matters.112  The Ninth Circuit 
recognized that “typical employment relationship[s]” do not result in an 
employer’s “control over non-workplace matters[,] such as housing, meals, 
and transportation.”113  However, the H–2A program added a unique element
to the work relationship; the program required entities to provide “material 
terms and conditions of employment,”114 which included “housing,
transportation, and either low-priced meals or access to cooking facilities.”115 
The H–2A program, the court concluded, “thus expand[ed] the employment
relationship.”116 
Perhaps the Ninth Circuit was concerned about the far-reaching 
consequences of abusing guest worker programs and the ramifications on 
the agricultural worker.117  National lobbying efforts strongly support
agricultural employers, rather than their employees.118  Additionally, some
nonprofits have concluded that employee rights violations are “rampant 
and systemic” under the H–2A program.119  An influx in foreign workers
in the agricultural industry effectively “deprives all [domestic and H–2A] 
farmworkers of bargaining powers and political influence.”120  The use of 
foreign agricultural workers also deflates the average wages paid in the 
agricultural sector.121  Yet, the abolition of the H–2A program would rob 
the agricultural industry of its workforce.122  Thus, this broad application
of the Darden test to find joint employer liability should not be applied to 
the agricultural industry. 
112. Glob. Horizons, 915 F.3d at 639. 
113. Id.
 114. Id. at 639–40 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(b)(1) (2018)). 
115. Id. at 639 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(c) (2018)).
116. Id. at 640. 
117. Farmworker Justice found that “[g]uest worker programs drive down wages and 
working conditions of U.S. workers and deprive foreign workers of economic bargaining 
power and the opportunity to gain political representation.”  FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra 
note 41, at 7. 
118. “In 2017, the agribusiness sector spent more money lobbying congress ($131.9
million) than defense contractors ($127.4 million).”  Huennekens, supra note 33 (citing 
Ranked Sectors: 2017, CTR. RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?
showYear=2017&indexType=c [https://perma.cc/LQA6-FBGJ]).
119. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 7 (“The U.S. Department of Labor 
(DOL), which has primary responsibility for administering the H–2A program, frequently 
approves illegal job terms in the H–2A workers’ contracts.”). 
120. Id. at 7–8. 
121. In 2017, “H–2A workers were paid less than the average nationwide wage.”
Huennekens, supra note 33. 
122. Without the H–2A program, farmers would lack “the workforce [they] need[] to
produce our fruits, vegetables[,] and livestock.”  FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 8. 
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2. Nullifying Contract Law 
In concluding that the farmers were joint employers of the Thai workers, 
the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that as a federal law, the H–2A’s 
mandates preempted Global Horizons’ and the two farmers’ contract
terms.123  Federal preemption is not a new concept.124  However, the issue
is whether applying the joint employer liability theory to override contract 
terms is the correct conclusion in the agricultural industry. 
Under the terms of the labor contract, Global Horizons had agreed to
provide housing and non-orchard-related resources to the workers.125 This
framework enables farmers to keep costs low rather than passing additional 
expenses through to the consumer,126 while maintaining an adequate supply
of laborers.127  Thus, by applying joint employer liability to the agricultural
industry, a court undermines the industry’s carefully planned economic 
infrastructure.  Advocates should instead turn to other methods to deter the 
harassment of this vulnerable portion of the workforce.128 
IV. THE EXPANSION OF THE JOINT EMPLOYER LIABILITY THEORY
In Global Horizons, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the circuit split by 
finding joint employer status after applying Darden’s common law agency
test. Yet, it is unclear whether the court considered a public policy exception 
for the agricultural industry; without better-structured financial liability 
systems in place, additional expenses may pass through to consumers.129 
Without a doubt, victims of Title VII violations should be fairly compensated
—but that compensation should derive from the party legally and financially 
responsible.130  Perhaps the H–2A program should be revamped to better 
reflect the nuances of the agricultural industry and ensure that labor contractors 
are not “judgment-proof.”131  In the meantime, courts should consider the
far-reaching consequences of meddling with labor frameworks in the 
123. 
124.  See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
125.  See supra Section II.C.1. 
126.  See supra Section II.B. 
127.  See supra Section II.A. 
128.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 640 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 129. See infra Section IV.A.
130. Labor contractors should be able to foot the bill because they collect fees from
guest workers upfront. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
131. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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agricultural industry because it is an industry that relies heavily on low 
costs.132  More precisely, the issues that remain are twofold: Whether Darden
really supports a finding of joint employer liability,133 and whether Darden
should yield to a public policy exception for the agricultural industry.134 
This Part considers whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision to apply the 
agency test was in the best interest of the agricultural industry, how Global 
Horizons will impact California in particular, and how this reading will 
expand the list of defendants in other industries, as well. 
A. The Agricultural Industry’s Influence in the Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit is often touted as “a model of innovation.”135  Yet,
the Ninth Circuit’s new precedent strikes a vital blow to many California 
employers. California employs the largest number of labor contractors in 
the nation.136  California is a leading agricultural producer in the United 
States, contributing more than “a third of the country’s vegetables and 
two-thirds of the country’s fruits and nuts.”137  In recent years, California
has exported more than $20 billion worth of produce.138 
Expanding the joint employer liability theory is not the only way to deter 
systemic violations.  Perhaps a better method to regulate the agricultural 
industry is to implement more frequent and thorough Department of Labor 
(DOL) checks.139  Although farmers may be held liable for discrimination
132. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
133. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
134. Courts have made public policy exceptions under Title VII. See, e.g., Keenan
v. Allan, 889 F. Supp. 1320, 1350, 1357, 1359 (1995) (listing public policy as an exception 
to Title VII’s default rules), aff’d, 91 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1996). 
135. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33189, PROPOSALS IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 
TO SPLIT THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS (2006), https://www.everycrsreport.com/ 
files/20061122_RL33189_217684cafbc4fd7556e1d253644dbed9d20f651f.pdf  [https://perma.cc/
A3N9-UC6U]; see also John M. Roll, Split the Ninth Circuit: It’s Time, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Sept.
2005, at 34, 34, https://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/0905procon3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HUZ8-F259] (“Whether viewed from the vantage point of population,
caseload, number of judges[,] or number of states, the Ninth Circuit dwarfs all other federal 
circuits.”). 
136. Occupational Employment Statistics, supra note 37. 
137. California Agricultural Productions Statistics: 2018 Crop Year—Top 10 Commodities 
for California Agriculture, CAL. DEP’T FOOD & AGRIC., https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/
[https://perma.cc/3EWF-4WJH].
138. CAL. DEP’T FOOD & AGRIC., CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS: 2017–2018, 
at 105, https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/PDFs/2017-18AgExports.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8Q2M-6K9U].
139.  The DOL is a federal agency that: 
[F]osters and promotes the welfare of the job seekers, wage earners, and retirees 
of the United States by improving working conditions, advancing their opportunities 
for profitable employment, protecting their retirement and health care benefits, 
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under Title VII, the labor contractor’s role should not be minimized; instead, 
the labor contractor should be rightfully held accountable for its own 
violations.140  The labor contractor maintains a closer connection to the
workers: they recruit the workers, furnish housing for the workers, and 
even provide workers with transportation.141  Thus, they have superior
knowledge over the conditions of employment compared to the farmers.  
Moreover, the DOL has adequate information to implement consistent and 
frequent check-ins with the labor contractors that it licenses.142 
Another preferable method may be an agricultural annexation into
federal labor law. Currently, agricultural workers are explicitly exempted
from the NLRA,143 which deprives guest workers from “protection for 
joining unions and engaging in collective bargaining.”144  Although agricultural
workers can still organize,145 their collective bargaining power146 may be 
helping employers find workers, strengthening free collective bargaining, and
tracking changes in employment, prices, and other national economic measurements.
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://webapps.dol.gov/dolfaq/go-dol-
faq.asp?faqid=478&topicid=9&subtopicid=151 [https://perma.cc/8ASY-WPG5].  The DOL
may have better oversight ability because it can view labor contracts:
[The] DOL should increase oversight and enforcement in the H–2A program. 
[The] DOL must address illegal terms and programs violations more effectively, 
including rejecting terms aimed at discouraging U.S. workers, . . . imposing
fines on employers that deter illegal conduct, and barring employers from the 
program when serious violations occur.
FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 8. 
140. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 8 (“[The] DOL should shine a light on 
the dark world of labor recruitment [and] examine . . . international recruitment 
mechanisms . . . .”). 
141. See, e.g., EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., No. CV-11-3045-EFS, 2012 WL 
3095577, at *3 (E.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), rev’d and remanded 915 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 
2019).
142. When a farm labor contractor applies for a license from the DOL, it must
disclose the “physical address of the location of . . . housing” to the DOL.  CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 8, § 13660(a)(3) (2019), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/regulation_detail/Clean_
Copy_of_the_Final_Text_of_FLC_Regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM79-E3MP].
143.  National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
144. Labor Laws, NAT’L FARM WORKER MINISTRY, http://nfwm.org/resources/labor-
laws/ [https://perma.cc/6WLD-3FCW].
145. For a brief summary of organizational efforts made by organizers such as Cesar
Chavez, the United Farm Workers (UFW), and the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW), 
see id. 
146. Collective bargaining helps alleviate the “inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and 
employers.”  National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
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inadequate to ensure better employment terms and working conditions.147 
Even current state protections may be inadequate: in California, additional
state legislation has not yet reached employment terms and working
conditions,148 which means that agricultural work environments are not
highly regulated.  However, new developments in California union rights 
may be just the solution needed here.149 
B. Industries Other than Agriculture Should See a Similar Shift
The expansion of joint employer liability will not affect merely the agricultural
industry. This precedent will also affect franchises.150  Franchises have
previously used the instrumentality test to determine vicarious liability.151 
147. The chief legislation protecting farm workers is the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protections Act of 1983.  See generally 29 U.S.C. ch. 20 (2012). Yet, 
this legislation may still be inadequate: 
The law contains some important protections such as employers must disclose 
terms of employment at the time of recruitment, farm labor contractors “FLCs”
must be licensed by the U.S., provided housing must meet local and federal housing 
standards and transport vehicles must meet basic federal safety standards . . . .
Most farm workers lack basic labor protections such as workers’ compensation,
health insurance[,] and disability insurance.
US Labor Law for Farm Workers, NAT’L FARM WORKER MINISTRY, http://nfwm.org/farm-
workers/farm-worker-issues/labor-laws/ [https://perma.cc/5ZQK-64RT].
148. See, e.g., INDUS. WELFARE COMM’N, ORDER NO. 14–2001, REGULATING WAGES,
HOURS, AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS (2019),
https://www.dir.ca.gov/IWC/IWCArticle14.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AVK-YUH7].  Harassing 
conduct is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the working environment.”  STEVEN L. 
WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 461 (6th ed. 2017).  By 
addressing meal periods, rest breaks, and minimum wages, the state legislation builds a 
foundation for workplace expectations—but it does not guarantee workers a job that is free 
from harassing conduct that alters the working environment. 
149. By recognizing a stronger right to organized labor, unions may be the answer 
to ensuring foreign workers are treated with integrity and respect and not subject to illegal 
behavior.  Recently, the Ninth Circuit upheld a California Agricultural Labor Relations 
Board regulation that “allow[s] union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer 
worksites.”  Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma, 923 F.3d 524, 526–27 (9th Cir. 2019).  Thus, 
unions may now have better access to agricultural workers and be able to negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements that are more beneficial to the workers.  See, e.g., Yeongsik Kim, 
Comment, Using Collective Bargaining to Combat LGBT Discrimination in the Private-
Sector Workplace, 30 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 73, 75 (2015) (“Collective-bargaining 
agreements represent the most efficient and effective, and sometimes exclusive, means of 
enforcing the rights guaranteed under the collective-bargaining agreement.”). 
150. “The application of the joint-employer standard to the franchising context is
imminent.”  Thomas J. Walsh III, Comment, Supersizing the Definition of Employer Under the 
National Labor Relations Act—Broadening the Joint-Employer Standard to Include Franchisors 
and Franchisees, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 589, 634 (2016). 
151. See, e.g., Mary-Christine Sungaila & Martin M. Ellison, Joint Employer Liability in
the Franchise Context: One Year After Patterson v. Domino’s, 35 FRANCHISE L.J. 339, 340 
(2016). 
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However, the new test will likely be a much broader control requirement
because franchises often dictate various employee standards.152 
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision further solidifies the circuit split on joint
employer liability. However, the Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the agency 
test further expands this liability because it puts forth a much broader control 
requirement.  The agricultural industry, and California in particular, should
see a swift reduction in the use of labor contractors and an increase in crop 
prices.  Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s momentous presence in federal law means
that this decision will be much further reaching than other commentators 
have fathomed. Advocates seeking to protect agricultural workers’ rights 
might find the best remedies couched in expanded union rights. 
152. Rather than actual control, courts might consider “indirect” or “a reserved right
to control,” a type of control gaining momentum under the NLRA.  E.g., Browning-Ferris 
Indus. of Cal. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1199–200 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
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